start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 6.1.189, 6.4.4
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute Back during the discussion of commit a9a3ed1eff36 ("x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try") we discussed the need for a function attribute to control the omission of stack protectors on a per-function basis; at the time Clang had support for no_stack_protector but GCC did not. This was fixed in gcc-11. Now that the function attribute is available, let's start using it. Callers of boot_init_stack_canary need to use this function attribute unless they're compiled with -fno-stack-protector, otherwise the canary stored in the stack slot of the caller will differ upon the call to boot_init_stack_canary. This will lead to a call to __stack_chk_fail() then panic.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
From 420594296838fdc9a674470d710cda7d1487f9f4 · fixed in 5a7e8f89cdee16db705905a5b1ce2100b13dd63e; From 420594296838fdc9a674470d710cda7d1487f9f4 · fixed in 25e73018b4093e0cfbcec5dc4a4bb86d0b69ed56; From 420594296838fdc9a674470d710cda7d1487f9f4 · fixed in 514ca14ed5444b911de59ed3381dfd195d99fe4b
- Linux Linux
2.6.30
- KernelLinux
From 2.6.30 · fixed in 6.1.189; From 6.2.0 · fixed in 6.4.4