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CVE-2023-46254GHSA-6758-979H-249X

Service accounts can see namespaces of other tenants in capsule-proxy

Published
Last modified
published
Not listed in CISA KEV
Fix
Fixed in 0.4.5
None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub

Summary

capsule-proxy is a reverse proxy for Capsule kubernetes multi-tenancy framework. A bug in the RoleBinding reflector used by `capsule-proxy` gives ServiceAccount tenant owners the right to list Namespaces of other tenants backed by the same owner kind and name. For example consider two tenants `solar` and `wind`. Tenant `solar`, owned by a ServiceAccount named `tenant-owner` in the Namespace `solar`. Tenant `wind`, owned by a ServiceAccount named `tenant-owner` in the Namespace `wind`. The Tenant owner `solar` would be able to list the namespaces of the Tenant `wind` and vice-versa, although this is not correct. The bug introduces an exfiltration vulnerability since allows the listing of Namespace resources of other Tenants, although just in some specific conditions: 1. `capsule-proxy` runs with the `--disable-caching=false` (default value: `false`) and 2. Tenant owners are ServiceAccount, with the same resource name, but in different Namespaces. This vulnerability doesn't allow any privilege escalation on the outer tenant Namespace-scoped resources, since the Kubernetes RBAC is enforcing this. This issue has been addressed in version 0.4.5. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Timeline

  1. CVE published
  2. Record last updated

Affected versions

  • projectcapsule capsule-proxy

    fixed in 0.4.5

  • github.com/projectcapsule/capsuleGo

    fixed in 0.4.5

  • github.com/projectcapsule/capsule-proxyGo

    fixed in 0.4.5

References 2

GitHub · projectcapsule/capsule-proxy