HTTP/2 CONTINUATION flood in net/http
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.21.9, 1.22.2, 0.23.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- 1 proof of concept on GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
An attacker may cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data by sending an excessive number of CONTINUATION frames. Maintaining HPACK state requires parsing and processing all HEADERS and CONTINUATION frames on a connection. When a request's headers exceed MaxHeaderBytes, no memory is allocated to store the excess headers, but they are still parsed. This permits an attacker to cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data, all associated with a request which is going to be rejected. These headers can include Huffman-encoded data which is significantly more expensive for the receiver to decode than for an attacker to send. The fix sets a limit on the amount of excess header frames we will process before closing a connection.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
- EPSS reached 10%
FIRST estimates at least a 10% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days
Affected versions
- net/http
fixed in 1.21.9; From 1.22.0-0 · fixed in 1.22.2
- golang.org/x/net/http2
fixed in 0.23.0
- stdlibGo
fixed in 1.21.9; From 1.22.0-0 · fixed in 1.22.2
- golang.org/x/netGo
fixed in 0.23.0
- net/httpGo
fixed in 1.21.9
- golang.org/x/net/http2Go
fixed in 0.23.0
- net/httpGo
From 1.22.0-0 · fixed in 1.22.2