Hydra's contestation period in head datum can be modified during Close transaction, allowing malicious participant to freely modify the contestation deadline
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.13.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Hydra is the layer-two scalability solution for Cardano. Prior to version 0.13.0, the specification states that the contestation period in the datum of the UTxO at the head validator must stay unchanged as the state progresses from Open to Closed (Close transaction), but no such check appears to be performed in the `checkClose` function of the head validator. This would allow a malicious participant to modify the contestation deadline of the head to either allow them to fanout the head without giving another participant the chance to contest, or prevent any participant from ever redistributing the funds locked in the head via a fan-out. Version 0.13.0 contains a patch for this issue.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- input-output-hk hydra
fixed in 0.13.0