A stack exhaustion flaw in control channel code may cause named to terminate unexpectedly
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
The code that processes control channel messages sent to `named` calls certain functions recursively during packet parsing. Recursion depth is only limited by the maximum accepted packet size; depending on the environment, this may cause the packet-parsing code to run out of available stack memory, causing `named` to terminate unexpectedly. Since each incoming control channel message is fully parsed before its contents are authenticated, exploiting this flaw does not require the attacker to hold a valid RNDC key; only network access to the control channel's configured TCP port is necessary. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.2.0 through 9.16.43, 9.18.0 through 9.18.18, 9.19.0 through 9.19.16, 9.9.3-S1 through 9.16.43-S1, and 9.18.0-S1 through 9.18.18-S1.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- ISC BIND 9
From 9.2.0 · through 9.16.43; From 9.18.0 · through 9.18.18; From 9.19.0 · through 9.19.16; From 9.9.3-S1 · through 9.16.43-S1; From 9.18.0-S1 · through 9.18.18-S1