NextCloud Cookbook's pull-checks.yml workflow is vulnerable to OS Command Injection
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
NextCloud Cookbook is a recipe library app. Prior to commit a46d9855 on the `master` branch and commit 489bb744 on the `main-0.9.x` branch, the `pull-checks.yml` workflow is vulnerable to command injection attacks because of using an untrusted `github.head_ref` field. The `github.head_ref` value is an attacker-controlled value. Assigning the value to `zzz";echo${IFS}"hello";#` can lead to command injection. Since the permission is not restricted, the attacker has a write-access to the repository. This issue is fixed in commit a46d9855 on the `master` branch and commit 489bb744 on the `main-0.9.x` branch. There is no risk for the user of the app within the NextCloud server. This only affects the main repository and possible forks of it. Those who have forked the NextCloud Cookbook repository should make sure their forks are on the latest version to prevent code injection attacks and similar.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- nextcloud cookbook
master < a46d9855, main-0.9.x < 489bb744