Envoy client may fake the header `x-envoy-original-path`
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.25.3, 1.24.4, 1.23.6, 1.22.9
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy designed for cloud-native applications. Prior to versions 1.26.0, 1.25.3, 1.24.4, 1.23.6, and 1.22.9, the client may bypass JSON Web Token (JWT) checks and forge fake original paths. The header `x-envoy-original-path` should be an internal header, but Envoy does not remove this header from the request at the beginning of request processing when it is sent from an untrusted client. The faked header would then be used for trace logs and grpc logs, as well as used in the URL used for `jwt_authn` checks if the `jwt_authn` filter is used, and any other upstream use of the x-envoy-original-path header. Attackers may forge a trusted `x-envoy-original-path` header. Versions 1.26.0, 1.25.3, 1.24.4, 1.23.6, and 1.22.9 have patches for this issue.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- envoyproxy envoy
From 1.25.0 · fixed in 1.25.3; From 1.24.0 · fixed in 1.24.4; From 1.23.0 · fixed in 1.23.6; fixed in 1.22.9