NULL dereference during PKCS7 data verification
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 3.0.8, 300.0.12
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
A NULL pointer can be dereferenced when signatures are being verified on PKCS7 signed or signedAndEnveloped data. In case the hash algorithm used for the signature is known to the OpenSSL library but the implementation of the hash algorithm is not available the digest initialization will fail. There is a missing check for the return value from the initialization function which later leads to invalid usage of the digest API most likely leading to a crash. The unavailability of an algorithm can be caused by using FIPS enabled configuration of providers or more commonly by not loading the legacy provider. PKCS7 data is processed by the SMIME library calls and also by the time stamp (TS) library calls. The TLS implementation in OpenSSL does not call these functions however third party applications would be affected if they call these functions to verify signatures on untrusted data.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- OpenSSL OpenSSL
From 3.0.0 · fixed in 3.0.8
- openssl-srccrates.io
From 300.0.0 · fixed in 300.0.12