sctp: handle the error returned from sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: handle the error returned from sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key When it returns an error from sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(), the active_key is actually not updated. The old sh_key will be freeed while it's still used as active key in asoc. Then an use-after-free will be triggered when sending patckets, as found by syzbot: sctp_auth_shkey_hold+0x22/0xa0 net/sctp/auth.c:112 sctp_set_owner_w net/sctp/socket.c:132 [inline] sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc+0xbd5/0x1a20 net/sctp/socket.c:1863 sctp_sendmsg+0x1053/0x1d50 net/sctp/socket.c:2025 inet_sendmsg+0x99/0xe0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:819 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:734 This patch is to fix it by not replacing the sh_key when it returns errors from sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() in sctp_auth_set_key(). For sctp_auth_set_active_key(), old active_key_id will be set back to asoc->active_key_id when the same thing happens.

Timeline

1. Sep 15, 2025, 2:01 PM UTCCVE published
2. Aug 5, 2026, 8:57 AM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• Linux Linux

  From 4.19.199 · fixed in 4.19.262; From 5.4.136 · fixed in 5.4.220; From 5.10.54 · fixed in 5.10.150; From 5.13.6 · fixed in 5.14

• Linux Linux

  5.14

References 7