Capsule vulnerable to privilege escalation by ServiceAccount deployed in a Tenant Namespace
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.1.3
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
Capsule is a multi-tenancy and policy-based framework for Kubernetes. Prior to version 0.1.3, a ServiceAccount deployed in a Tenant Namespace, when granted with `PATCH` capabilities on its own Namespace, is able to edit it and remove the Owner Reference, breaking the reconciliation of the Capsule Operator and removing all the enforcement like Pod Security annotations, Network Policies, Limit Range and Resource Quota items. An attacker could detach the Namespace from a Tenant that is forbidding starting privileged Pods using the Pod Security labels by removing the OwnerReference, removing the enforcement labels, and being able to start privileged containers that would be able to start a generic Kubernetes privilege escalation. Patches have been released for version 0.1.3. No known workarounds are available.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- clastix capsule
fixed in 0.1.3
- github.com/clastix/capsuleGo
fixed in 0.1.3