Lack of proper validation in immudb
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.4.1
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
immudb is a database with built-in cryptographic proof and verification. immudb client SDKs use server's UUID to distinguish between different server instance so that the client can connect to different immudb instances and keep the state for multiple servers. SDK does not validate this uuid and can accept any value reported by the server. A malicious server can change the reported UUID tricking the client to treat it as a different server thus accepting a state completely irrelevant to the one previously retrieved from the server. This issue has been patched in version 1.4.1. As a workaround, when initializing an immudb client object a custom state handler can be used to store the state. Providing custom implementation that ignores the server UUID can be used to ensure that even if the server changes the UUID, client will still consider it to be the same server.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- codenotary immudb
fixed in 1.4.1
- github.com/codenotary/immudbGo
fixed in 1.4.1