miniOrange SAML Authentication Bypass
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 30.5, 20.3, 40.4, 30.2, 20.2, and 1 more
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
Xecurify's miniOrange Premium, Standard, and Enterprise Drupal SAML SP modules possess an authentication and authorization bypass vulnerability. An attacker with access to a HTTP-request intercepting method is able to bypass authentication and authorization by removing the SAML Assertion Signature - impersonating existing users and existing roles, including administrative users/roles. This vulnerability is not mitigated by configuring the module to enforce signatures or certificate checks. Xecurify recommends updating miniOrange modules to their most recent versions. This vulnerability is present in paid versions of the miniOrange Drupal SAML SP product affecting Drupal 7, 8, and 9.
Timeline
- CVE published
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Xecuify Drupal 8 miniOrange SAML SP
fixed in 30.5; fixed in 20.3; fixed in 40.4
- Xecuify Drupal 9 miniOrange SAML SP
fixed in 30.5; fixed in 20.3; fixed in 40.4
- Xecuify Drupal 7 miniOrange SAML SP
fixed in 30.2; fixed in 20.2; fixed in 40.2