Samba: out-of-bounds read in winbind auth_crap
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
An out-of-bounds read vulnerability was found in Samba due to insufficient length checks in winbindd_pam_auth_crap.c. When performing NTLM authentication, the client replies to cryptographic challenges back to the server. These replies have variable lengths, and Winbind fails to check the lan manager response length. When Winbind is used for NTLM authentication, a maliciously crafted request can trigger an out-of-bounds read in Winbind, possibly resulting in a crash.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- samba
Version range not reported
- samba
Version range not reported
- samba
Version range not reported
- samba
Version range not reported
- samba
Version range not reported
- samba
Version range not reported
- samba
Version range not reported
- samba
Version range not reported
- samba4
Version range not reported
- samba
Version range not reported
- samba
Version range not reported