# CVE-2021-47288: media: ngene: Fix out-of-bounds bug in ngene\_command\_config\_free\_buf()

- Severity: no CVSS score reported
- CISA SSVC: exploitation=none, automatable=no, technicalImpact=partial
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Published: 2024-05-21 · Updated: 2026-05-11

## Affected

- Linux: version range not reported
- Linux: 2.6.34

## Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: ngene: Fix out-of-bounds bug in ngene_command_config_free_buf() Fix an 11-year old bug in ngene_command_config_free_buf() while addressing the following warnings caught with -Warray-bounds: arch/alpha/include/asm/string.h:22:16: warning: '__builtin_memcpy' offset [12, 16] from the object at 'com' is out of the bounds of referenced subobject 'config' with type 'unsigned char' at offset 10 [-Warray-bounds] arch/x86/include/asm/string_32.h:182:25: warning: '__builtin_memcpy' offset [12, 16] from the object at 'com' is out of the bounds of referenced subobject 'config' with type 'unsigned char' at offset 10 [-Warray-bounds] The problem is that the original code is trying to copy 6 bytes of data into a one-byte size member _config_ of the wrong structue FW_CONFIGURE_BUFFERS, in a single call to memcpy(). This causes a legitimate compiler warning because memcpy() overruns the length of &com.cmd.ConfigureBuffers.config. It seems that the right structure is FW_CONFIGURE_FREE_BUFFERS, instead, because it contains 6 more members apart from the header _hdr_. Also, the name of the function ngene_command_config_free_buf() suggests that the actual intention is to ConfigureFreeBuffers, instead of ConfigureBuffers (which takes place in the function ngene_command_config_buf(), above). Fix this by enclosing those 6 members of struct FW_CONFIGURE_FREE_BUFFERS into new struct config, and use &com.cmd.ConfigureFreeBuffers.config as the destination address, instead of &com.cmd.ConfigureBuffers.config, when calling memcpy(). This also helps with the ongoing efforts to globally enable -Warray-bounds and get us closer to being able to tighten the FORTIFY_SOURCE routines on memcpy().

## What to do

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## Related

- Browse: [Linux kernel](https://cve.now/tech/linux-kernel.md) · [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4487b968e5eacd02c493303dc2b61150bb7fe4b2
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c6ddeb63dd543b5474b0217c4e47538b7ffd7686
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e818f2ff648581a6c553ae2bebc5dcef9a8bb90c
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec731c6ef564ee6fc101fc5d73e3a3a953d09a00
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e617fa62f6cf859a7b042cdd6c73af905ff8fca3
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e991457afdcb5f4dbc5bc9d79eaf775be33e7092
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b9a178f189bb6d75293573e181928735f5e3e070
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d4abca95ecc82fc8c41912fa0085281f19cc29f

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