Permissions check bypass in Seafile
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
Seafile is an open source cloud storage system. A sync token is used in Seafile file syncing protocol to authorize access to library data. To improve performance, the token is cached in memory in seaf-server. Upon receiving a token from sync client or SeaDrive client, the server checks whether the token exist in the cache. However, if the token exists in cache, the server doesn't check whether it's associated with the specific library in the URL. This vulnerability makes it possible to use any valid sync token to access data from any known library. Note that the attacker has to first find out the ID of a library which it has no access to. The library ID is a random UUID, which is not possible to be guessed. There are no workarounds for this issue.
Timeline
- CVE published
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- haiwen seafile-server
Community Edition < 8.0.8, Pro Edition < 8.0.15