Possible request smuggling in HTTP/2 due missing validation of content-length
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 4.1.61.Final
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.61.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. The content-length header is not correctly validated if the request only uses a single Http2HeaderFrame with the endStream set to to true. This could lead to request smuggling if the request is proxied to a remote peer and translated to HTTP/1.1. This is a followup of GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj/CVE-2021-21295 which did miss to fix this one case. This was fixed as part of 4.1.61.Final.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- netty netty
fixed in 4.1.61.Final
- io.netty:netty-codec-http2Maven
From 4.0.0 · fixed in 4.1.61.Final
- org.jboss.netty:nettyMaven
All versions
- io.netty:nettyMaven
All versions
References 25
GitHub · netty/netty
cve.mitre.org
debian.org
lists.apache.org
- thread.html/r70c3a7bfa904f06a1902f4df20ee26e4f09a46b8fd3eb304dc57a2de@<dev.zookeeper.apache.org>
- thread.html/ra66e93703e3f4bd31bdfd0b6fb0c32ae96b528259bb1aa2b6d38e401@<issues.zookeeper.apache.org>
- thread.html/r2732aa3884cacfecac4c54cfaa77c279ba815cad44b464a567216f83@<issues.zookeeper.apache.org>
- thread.html/r0ca82fec33334e571fe5b388272260778883e307e15415d7b1443de2@<issues.zookeeper.apache.org>
- thread.html/r823d4b27fcba8dad5fe945bdefce3ca5a0031187966eb6ef3cc22ba9@<issues.zookeeper.apache.org>
- thread.html/r101f82d8f3b5af0bf79aecbd5b2dd3b404f6bb51d1a54c2c3d29bed9@<notifications.zookeeper.apache.org>
- thread.html/rf521ff2be2e2dd38984174d3451e6ee935c845948845c8fccd86371d@<issues.zookeeper.apache.org>
- thread.html/r5cbea8614812289a9b98d0cfc54b47f54cef424ac98d5e315b791795@<notifications.zookeeper.apache.org>
- thread.html/rdd206d9dd7eb894cc089b37fe6edde2932de88d63a6d8368b44f5101@<commits.zookeeper.apache.org>
- thread.html/rac8cf45a1bab9ead5c9a860cbadd6faaeb7792203617b6ec3874736d@<issues.zookeeper.apache.org>
- thread.html/r4a98827bb4a7edbd69ef862f2351391845697c40711820d10df52ca5@<commits.zookeeper.apache.org>
- thread.html/r69efd8ef003f612c43e4154e788ca3b1f837feaacd16d97854402355@<commits.zookeeper.apache.org>
- thread.html/r4b8be87acf5b9c098a2ee350b5ca5716fe7afeaf0a21a4ee45a90687@<issues.zookeeper.apache.org>
- thread.html/re4b0141939370304d676fe23774d0c6fbc584b648919825402d0cb39@<notifications.zookeeper.apache.org>
- thread.html/rdd5715f3ee5e3216d5e0083a07994f67da6dbb9731ce9e7a6389b18e@<commits.zookeeper.apache.org>
- thread.html/r1b3cb056364794f919aaf26ceaf7423de64e7fdd05a914066e7d5219@<issues.zookeeper.apache.org>
- thread.html/rf38e4dcdefc7c59f7ba0799a399d6d6e37b555d406a1dfc2fcbf0b35@<commits.pulsar.apache.org>
- thread.html/r61564d86a75403b854cdafee67fc69c8b88c5f6802c2c838f4282cc8@<commits.pulsar.apache.org>
- thread.html/r7879ddcb990c835c6b246654770d836f9d031dee982be836744e50ed@<commits.pulsar.apache.org>
- thread.html/r5baac01f9e06c40ff7aab209d5751b3b58802c63734e33324b70a06a@<issues.flink.apache.org>