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CVE-2021-21295GHSA-WM47-8V5P-WJPJBIT-ZOOKEEPER-2021-21295

Possible request smuggling in HTTP/2 due missing validation

Published
Last modified
published
Not listed in CISA KEV
Fix
Fixed in 4.1.60.Final, 3.5.10
None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
  • Exploitation: none
  • Automatable: yes
  • Technical impact: partial

Summary

Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.

Timeline

  1. CVE published
  2. CISA SSVC assessment

    Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial

  3. Record last updated
  4. EPSS reached 10%

    FIRST estimates at least a 10% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days

Affected versions

  • netty io.netty:netty-codec-http2

    fixed in 4.1.60.Final

  • zookeeperBitnami

    From 3.5.9 · fixed in 3.5.10

  • io.netty:netty-codec-http2Maven

    From 4.0.0 · fixed in 4.1.60.Final

  • org.jboss.netty:nettyMaven

    All versions

  • io.netty:nettyMaven

    All versions

References 25

GitHub · netty/netty

GitHub · Netflix/zuul

lists.apache.org