zip slip in ORAS
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.9.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
ORAS is open source software which enables a way to push OCI Artifacts to OCI Conformant registries. ORAS is both a CLI for initial testing and a Go Module. In ORAS from version 0.4.0 and before version 0.9.0, there is a "zip-slip" vulnerability. The directory support feature allows the downloaded gzipped tarballs to be automatically extracted to the user-specified directory where the tarball can have symbolic links and hard links. A well-crafted tarball or tarballs allow malicious artifact providers linking, writing, or overwriting specific files on the host filesystem outside of the user-specified directory unexpectedly with the same permissions as the user who runs `oras pull`. Users of the affected versions are impacted if they are `oras` CLI users who runs `oras pull`, or if they are Go programs, which invoke `github.com/deislabs/oras/pkg/content.FileStore`. The problem has been fixed in version 0.9.0. For `oras` CLI users, there is no workarounds other than pulling from a trusted artifact provider. For `oras` package users, the workaround is to not use `github.com/deislabs/oras/pkg/content.FileStore`, and use other content stores instead, or pull from a trusted artifact provider.
Timeline
- CVE published
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- deislabs oras
From 0.4.0 · fixed in 0.9.0
- github.com/deislabs/orasGo
fixed in 0.9.0