Electron vulnerable to ID collision when routing IPC messages to renderers containing OOPIFs
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 9.4.0, 10.2.0, 11.1.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
The Electron framework lets users write cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. In versions of Electron IPC prior to 9.4.0, 10.2.0, 11.1.0, and 12.0.0-beta.9, messages sent from the main process to a subframe in the renderer process, through webContents.sendToFrame, event.reply or when using the remote module, can in some cases be delivered to the wrong frame. If your app uses remote, calls webContents.sendToFrame, or calls event.reply in an IPC message handler then it is impacted by this issue. This has been fixed in versions 9.4.0, 10.2.0, 11.1.0, and 12.0.0-beta.9. There are no known workarounds for this issue.
Timeline
- CVE published
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- electron electron
fixed in 9.4.0; From 10.0.0 · fixed in 10.2.0; From 11.0.0 · fixed in 11.1.0
- electronnpm
fixed in 9.4.0
- electronnpm
From 10.0.0 · fixed in 10.2.0
- electronnpm
From 11.0.0 · fixed in 11.1.0